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ENTRY 
This matter came on for hearing before the Oil and Gas Board 
of Review on May 4.1978 at· 10:30 a.m., at Fountain Square, Building 
C, Columbus, Ohio pursuant to a notice of appeal dated March 16, 
~<:!97~)and filed herein on March 17, 1978 by the Appellants appealing 
~;!7~~' from Adjudication Order No. 229 issued by Andrew G. Ska1kos, as 
;.Ie;.. 
/}~~ ~ Chief of the Division of Oil and Gas. on March 6, 1978. Witnesses I c;, 'f'..;;7 j/ ' testifying and exhibits filed in this appeal are listed in the 
indices to the transcript of the hearing. 
I. The Background 
Adjudication Order No. 229 is an order for the mandatory pooling, 
pursuant to the provisions. of Section 1509.27, Ohio Revised Code, 
of three tracts of land located in Portage County; Atwater Township, 
~hio. one of which tracts is held by the Appellants in fee simple 
.. 
subject to an oil and gas lease held by Viking Resources Corporation 
("Vikipg"). The order states that "mandatory pooling is hereby 
established ... to permit the drilling of wells under Percits 1369 
and 1370, Portage County, issued concurrently with this order ... ". 
These DvO wells are to be located on a tract of land held ~y 
Herbert and Ruth .P. Carsten in fee simple subject to an oil and 
gas lease held by Orion Energy Corporation ("Orion"). This Ca=sten 
tract lies to the North of the Appellant's tract and is one of the 
three trac~s of land subject to the mandatory pooling order. The 
third tract that is subject to the pooling order is locat~d to the 
South of the Appellant's tract and is held by Edward L. and Irene M. 
Kruse in fee simple subject to an oil and gas lease held by Orion. 
The adjudication order and permits 1369 and 1370 were issued 
in response to applications for permits to drill and for mandatory 
pooling submitted to the Division of Oil and Gas on August 31, 1977 
by Orion pursuant to Section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code. 
These applications were made by Orion as the "owner", as that term 
is defined in Section 1509.0l(K), Ohio Revised Code, of the Carsten 
tract upon which the two wells are proposed to be drilled. Orion 
is also the owner of Kruse Tract. The owner, in the statutory sense, 
. of the Appellant's tract is Viking, but Viking' 5 lease does not 
expressly authorize Viking to enter into a voluntary pooling agree-
ment. Viking did not object to the pooling of the three tracts but 
it would not enter into a voluntary pooling agreement wit~out the 
consent of the Appellants. The fee owners of the Carsten and Kruse 
tracts did not object to the pooling. The Appellants, hONever, 
did object to the pooling, whether voluntary ~r mandatory, and they 
requested a hearing on the applications pursuant to Section 1509.27 
of the Ohio Revised Code. 
Despite the objections of the Appellants, the drilling permits 
were issued a~d the applications for mandatory pooling ~ere granted, 
the pooling being ordered by the subject Adjudication Order. The 
Appellants then filed .their notice of appeal in this proceeding. 
II. The Issues 
In their request for a hearing on the applications £0- the 
drilling permits and the pooling orders, the Appellants stated 
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their objections in the following terms: 
[T1hat they do not believe tha.t ~·tandatory 
Pooling is necessary to protect correlative 
rights or to provide effectiv~ development 
use or conservation of oil and gas; further-
more, the lease of Pete and Wanda Karas, by 
its terms, prohibits unitization of any of 
their property without their express consent. 
The subject Karas property is a porticn of 
an approximate six-hundred acre block that 
is being fully and adequately developed by 
fifteen existing oil and gas ~oTells. Further-
more, it would be unjust and inequitable to 
impose Handatory Pooling upon said tract. 
In addition, the Mandatory Pooling Statute, 
O.R,C. 1509.27, is violative of the Ohio 
and U.S, Constitutions, 
[Chief ',s Exhibits Hand 11 
The notice of appeal herein expands .upon these objections in 
the following terms: 
Appellants, Pete and Wanda Karas, are 
appealing and requesting a hearing on ORDER 
NO. 229 on the grounds that they do not believe 
Mandatory Pooling is necessary to protect 
correlative rights or to provide effective 
development use or conservation of oil and gas; 
furthermore, the lease of Pete and t~anda Karas, 
by its terms, prohibits unitization of any 
other property without their expressed con-
sent. The subject, Karas property described 
above, (19.14 acres) is a portion of a 592.54 
acre tract which is being fully and adequately 
developed by 15 existing oil and gas wells. 
In order to be in compliance with the Division 
of Natural Resources Regulation ~ro-l-04 (C) 
(4) (A) a variance was granted. 
ORDER NO, 229 releases said 19.14 acre 
tract previously committed to the well drilled 
under Permit 1009 (on the 592.54 acre tract) 
and committed to the Mandatory Pooling unit 
created by ORDER NO. 229. 
In addition, Viking Resources Corporation 
o'f Cincinnati, Ohio, who holds the mineral 
leasehold to the Karas property, is without 
authority to participate in the }landatory 
Pooling arrangement with Orien Energy Corpo-
ration under the terms of the trust agreement 
wherein the property is held in trust for 
Katherine F. and \.Janda M. ' Karas " 
It would be unjust and inequitable to 
impose Mandatory Pooling upon said tract and 
the order of the Chief of the Division of 
Oil and Gas is unlawful and unreasonable 
under the circumstances. 
Finally, the Mandatory Pooling Statutes, 
O.R,C. 1509.27, et. seq., is violative of the 
Ohio U,S. Constitutions, inter alia, a taking 
of property i.s had wi thoutaue process and an 
impairment of the obligation of contract is 
created by the State of Ohio through the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources. 
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Th~ ~uestions presented for d~termination on this appeal are: 
L, Is the order appealed fr::;::n la.viul and reasonable? 
2. Is the Carsten tract of insufficient size or shaDe to me~t ~~~.~ . 
therequi~ements for drilling a well thereon? 
3, Has the owner of the Carsten tract been unable to form a 
drilling unit under agreement for voluntary pooling? 
4. Is the mandatory pooling order herein (i) necessary to 
protect correlative rights or (ii) to provide effective development, 
use, or conservation of oil and gas? 
It should be noted that the Board is wit..'1out authority to 
determine the constitutional question raised by the Appellants. "ThE 
issue of constitutionality can never be administratively determined,' 
Mobil Oil Corp, v. Rocky River, 38 Ohio St. 2d 23. 26 (1974) 
(Emphasis by the Court]. At the same time, the question of whether 
the order is lawful and reasonable must, of necessity, involve some 
of the same issues as do the constitutional questions. 
III. Findings of Fact 
The Board finds that: 
1 •. The tract upon which the two proposed wells are to be 
drilled (the Carsten,tract) is roughly rectangular and consists of 
76 acres. The.westerly line of this tract is 809 feet long. the 
easterly line 852 feet long. 
2.. In view of the fact that the spacing requirements (Division 
of Oil and Gas Rule l50l;9-1~04) for a well below 4,000 feet require 
i) that the well be on a tract or drilling unit of at least 40 
acres and ii) that the well be located at least 500 feet fr.om the 
boundaries of the tract or drilling unit and at least 1000 feet 
from any other well, unless a larger drilling unit is formed no 
permit can lawful be issued for a well on the Carsten tract since 
the well could not be located at a distance of more than 426 feet 
from the northerly boundary or from the southerly boundary, 
3. Orion is the holder of an oil and gas lease to the Carsten 
tract and is the person who has the right to drill on that tract 
and to drill into and produce from a pool and to appropriate the 
oil or gas that he produces therefrom either for himself or others 
and is thus the owner of the Carsten tract, as "owner" is defined 
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in Ohio Revised Code § l509.01(K). 
4., Orion is also the holder of an oil and gas lease to the Kruse 
tract within the proposed drilling unit, which tract is located to the 
south of the Carsten tract and the Appellants~ tract and is adjacent 
to the Appellants' tract. Orion is thus the owne~ of the Kruse tract. 
5. The Kruse tract consists of 10,80 acres. It is approximately. 
rectangular and the easterly and westerly lines of the tract are 
approximately' 173 feet long~ 
6. In ,view of the spacing requirements, no permit can lawfully 
be issued for a well on the Kruse tract. 
7. If the Kruse and Carsten tracts were adjacent and ~ere pooled 
to form one- tract, the spacing requirements would permit two wells 
be drilled on the pooled tract. 
S. The Appellants' tract within the proposed drilling unit 
lies between, and is adjoined by, the Carsten tract to the North and 
the Kruse tract to the South. 
9. The Appellants' tract consists of 19.14 acres, is approximatel~ 
rectangular, and extends 308 feet from north to south. 
10. In view of the spacing requirements, no permit can lawfully 
be issued for a well on the Appellants' tract. 
11. The Appellants' tract within the proposed drilling unit is 
a part of a larger parcel of 592.54 acres belonging to the Appellants. 
This parcel, including the 19.14 acre tract within the proposed 
drilling unit, is subject to an oil and gas lease dated April 24, 1975, 
between Atlas Energy Group. Inc .• as Lessee, and the Appellants as 
Lessor. The Lessee's interest in this lease was thereafter at signed 
to Viking Resources Corporation on April 4, 1917. Viking is thus the 
person who has the right to drill on the entire parcel of 592.54 
acres (including the 19.14 acre tract within the proposed drilling 
unit) and to drill into and produce from a pool and to appropriate 
the oil or gas that he produces therefrom either for himself or others. 
12. The lease that is held by Viking with respect to the 
Appellants' tract contains no provision relating to the pooling 
or unitization of that tract with other tracts so as to form a 
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drilling unit. Such ?001ing is neither forbidden nor permitted by 
the express terms of the lease. Ohio R~vised Code § 1509.26, which 
was in effect at the time of the execution of the lease, does how-
ever give Viking the power to agree to pool the Appellants' tract 
with adjoining tracts to form a drilling unit. But see Meyers and 
Williams, Petroleum Conservation in Ohio, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 591, 602 
(1965). 
13. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1509.26 Orion attempted to 
secure a vqluntary pooling of the three tracts thac are the subject 
of the adjudication order so as to form a drilling unit permitting 
two wells to be drilled within the unit •. Orion was unable to form 
such a drilling unit under agreement because Viking would not agree 
to the pooling of the Appellants' tract within the unit. Viking has 
no objections to the pooling and would, in. fact, be benefitted by the 
F .tg, but it was not willing to enter into the agreement without 
the express permission of the Appellants. The Appellants objected, 
and still object, to any pooling of their tract. 
14. Pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 1509.26 Orion investigated 
the possibility of pooling the Carsten tract with lapd located to the 
North of that tract. Orion concluded that it would be impractical to 
form a voluntary drilling unit with the land to the North because 
the title to that land is subject to a receivership and is divided 
into many diverse interests. 
15. A drilling unit composed of the Carsten tract and land to 
the North of the Carsten tract would be uneconomic and would not be 
conducive to the effective development, use, or conservation of oil 
and gas because a well located on such a drilling unit would have 
to be inefficiently close to an existing well to the north that 
would drain the same area. 
16. A drilling unit composed of the Carsten tract and)land to 
the north of the Carsten tract would not be just and equitable as 
it would fail to protect the correlative rights appurtenant to the 
Kruse tract, which tract could not be included within such a drilling 
unit. 
17. Thus Orion was unable to form a drilling unit under agreement 
provided in section 1509.26 of the Revised Code. on a just and 
equitable basis. 
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18. T:lere are no oil or gas " ..:e 11.5 on a';'l.Y of the tracts that 
are the subject of rhe mandatory pool~ng order under appeal. 
19. There are. however. 15 wells on that portion of the 
Appellants' 592.54 acre parcel that is not within the proposed 
drilling unit. None of these wells arc ~-li::hin 500 feet or the 
boundary of the proposed drilling unit. nor are any of these wells 
within IQOO feet of either of the two proposed wells. Since the 
15 wells are located on oniy 592.54 acres, there was, before the 
subject order was entered. only 39,5 acres per well. The 15 wells 
were drilled pursuant to a variance granted by the Division of Oil 
and Gas from the acreage requirements of 1501:9-1-04(C)(4)(A). 
When the 19.14 acres of the Appellants' tract included _dthin the 
new drilling unit are subtracted from the parcel of 592.54 acres, 
the 15 wells are located on a parcel of only 573.40 acres so that 
there is only 38,23 acres per well. The adjudication order that 
is-subject to this appeal contains an additional variance that 
permits this reduction in acreage per well. Even when the parcel 
on which the wells are located is reduced to 573.uO acres. the 
variance amounts to a waiver of less than five percent of the 40 
acre requirement. Furthermore the proposed drilling unit contains 
105.94 acres on which only two wells will be located. Even if 
the Appellants 19.14 acres is not counted as part of the new 
drilling .unit. it would have 43\4 acres attributable to it. With 
the Appellants' tract included, each well on the new drilling unit 
will be on a 52:97 acre tract. The Appellants' tract does not have 
to be included within the drilling unit to satisfy th~ a~reage 
requirements. More importantly, when the two new wells are drill~d 
there will be a totai of 17 wells on 679.34 acres so that the 
average acreage attributable to each well will be 39.96 acres. rnus 
the total effect of the order under appeal is to reduce the amount 
of variation from the acreage requirements. 
20. Two of the wells on the Appellants' 592.54 acre parcel(~~ell! 
H2 and #3 as shmm on Appellants Exhibit 23} could drain production 
from the Carsten tract and one of these wells ({.V3) could also drain tr 
Kruse ',tract. There also r.:ay be some drainage from the Carsten tract t 
wells located on land to the north of the Carsten tract. 
21. The Adjudication Order that is the subject of this ap?eal 
does not permit the operator of the drilling unit to go upon the 
I 
land that constitutes the A?pellants' tract. In fact the order con-
tains the following restriction: 
Orion Energy Corporation, its employees or 
agents shall not trespass upon the surface 
of the lands of Pete and Wanda Karas, as 
unitized in this order, nor shall any attempt 
be made to utilize said land surface in the 
exploration, development or production of the 
wells permitted by this order. 
Nothing'in the Adjudication Order authorizes the operator ~f the 
drilling unit to commit any act that would constitute an actionable 
nuisance with respect to the Appellants' land. 
22. The lease of the Appellants' 592.54 acres provides that 
the'Appellants' are entitled to a one-eighth royalty of the productiox: 
of oil and gas from the Appellants' land. The order that is the 
subject of this appeal provides that "the pro-rata portion of the 
production to the owner of each tract [is to be] allocated on a 
surface acreage basis." Thus, since 11.93 acres of the Appellants' 
tract is allocated to the well authorized by Permit No, 1370, the 
Appellants will be entitled to a one-eight royalty in respect of 
11.93/52.97 (or 22.5 percent) of the production from that well. 
Since 7.21 acres of the Appellants' tract is allocated 'to the well 
authorized by Permit No. 1369, the Appellants will be entitled to 
a one-eighth royalty in re~pect of 7.21/52.97 (13.6 percent) of 
the production from that well. Although there may be some reduction 
in the ultimate production from the wells now located on the 
Appellants' 592.54 acre parcel to the extent that those wells drain 
deposits that are located under the new drilling unit, this lost 
production will be more than offset by the production of the two 
new wells. Thus the total royalty payments that the Appellants 
will receive under their lease should be increased by the issuance 
of the subject Adjudication Order and the drilling of the two neW" 
wells contemplated by that order. Furthermore the Appellants' are 
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not entitled to receive royalties on production that is properly 
attributable to the Carsten and Kruse tracts. 
23. The Appellants claim to be, and sincerely believe that 
they are, aggrieved or adversely affected by the Adjudication Order 
that is the subject of this Appeal. Thus the Appellants are 
entitled to bring this appeal pursuant to the provisions of section 
1509.36, Ohio Revised Code. The fact remains however that no 
legally protected interest of the Appellants is invaded or adversely 
affected by the subject order. 
24. The Appellants' objection to the order is not that it 
deprives them of the opportunity to have additional wells on or 
production from their land. Thus the Appellant Pete Karas testified 
with respect to wells on the Carsten land that he did not want any 
wells near his property line but that otherwise: "1 don't care 
what they do. If they pull the oil from underneath the 19 acres 
[the Appellants' tract]. then, more power to them." [Transcript 39, 
~4) In fact, the Appellants wish that they had never allowed any 
wells to be drilled on their land. Thus the Appellant Wanda Karas 
testified that, if they had the opportunity to do it over again, 
n[tlhere wouldn't be any lease at all," [TranscriPt 70}. 
25. The primary basis for the Appellants' objection to the 
subject order appears to be their unhappiness with the operation 
of the wells on their own land. This unhappiness is, of course, 
not.relevant to the question of whether wells should be drilled 
on the Ca~sten tract. The Appellants offered Appellants Exhibits 4 
through 22 for identification to show the bases for their unhappines~ 
with the operations of their lessee, but those exhibits were not 
admitted into evidence as they were not relevant to any question 
to be determined by the Board. 
26. The Appellants' objected that the two proposed wells are 
too near to their property 1ine. They are afraid thac their own 
land will be damaged by the drilling of the new wells [Transcript 
38-39] It cannot be presumed. however. that any such damage will 
occur. An oil or gas well is not a nuisance per ~. 
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27. The Appellants' also objected to the order L:landating the 
pooling of their tract with the Carsten and Kruse tracts on the basi.s 
that it would ir"Nol ve the Appellants in a "partnership" against their 
wishes. [Transcript 36, 47-48, 56, 60, 681] This objection, which 
is obviously sincerely made. appears to be based on ideological 
rather than economic grounds. The rationale behind this objection 
was stated by the Appellant Wanda Karas: 
Well, unitization, in my point of view, 
is partnership, and I'll tell you. I went 
through two different phases of life. I started 
out as a secretary, and when I was a secretary, 
all I was interested in was my l~~ch. my 
appearance, and doing my job, I had no worries 
about weather or any other conditions. I mean 
io1h~n you go t:hrough the phase I went through. 
you can realize this better, because when you 
go in the building. you have no rain coming in 
on you, or snow blowing, blizzards, and you 
don't have anything, any animals to worry about 
that you have to haul water in if your lights 
go out, you have to milk by hand, you have to 
worry to get in there on time, and have an air 
conditioned office in the summertime. In the 
wintertime, you have heat. We are out there 
in our part now where we don't have those 
things, I mean, and that's the reason, and when 
you have unitization, you have partnerships, 
and you don't know who you are going to unitize 
with, if they know how hard it is to work on that 
ground, what all the weather and everything, or 
if it's easy for them, you don't know how they 
got it. 
[Transcript 47~48) 
Well, my estimation of unitization is a 
partnership. I would have to be a partnership, 
because you are not the only one involved. you 
and your neighbors, whoever is in the unitization, 
is in together. He may be satisfied. just like 
the meaning I give you of the office worker 
going in, not caring about the weather, or the 
man that has to do it the hard way, he may be 
satisfied if they just tear the whole thing 
up, and not give him a penny, whre in the mean~ 
time, I have a different viet.;point. I appreciate 
the ground. The ground is more attractive to 
me than the oil well any day. and I have a 
different feeling towards things that my 
unitized partner might not have. 
[Transcript 60] 
The objections of the plaintiffs are perhaps best summarized by the 
following passage from the testimony of the Appellant Wanda Karas: 
"The only objection we have is we want to preserve our rights for not 
uniti"ing. and we don't want any damages on our ground." [Transcript 
68] 
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28 The objection that the order at issue forces the Appellants 
into an undesired partnership is based on a misconception of the facts. 
The Appellants are not compelled to do anything' by the order. Title 
to the Appellants l land remains in the Appellants subject to the oil 
and gas lease held by Viking, which lease was made by the Appellants 
of their own volition. The order does not permit anyone to go upon 
the Appellants' land or to damage that land, If a trespass or a nuisanl 
is committed the Appellants may seek their redress in the courts just 
as they could if the order were not issued. The order does not force 
'. 
, 
the Appellants into any partnership or joint venture. On the facts 
of this particular case the words "pooling" and "unitization" are 
mislea~ing and inappropriate. All that the subject order does is to 
permit the owner of the Carsten tract to drill two wells on the Carsten 
tract, subject to the condition that royalties must be paid to the 
Appellants and to the others who have interests in the land in the 
drilling unit. The order does not compel the Appellants to accept 
these royalties. 
29. The subject order is necessary to protect the correlative 
rights of those who have beneficial interests in the Carsten and 
Kruse tracts. The subject order is necessary to provide effective 
development and conservation of oil and gas. The pooling of the 
three tracts and the drilling of the two wells is the only feasible 
way of assuring those who have the beneficial interests in the Carsten 
and Kruse tracts of the reasonabl~ opportunity to recover and receive 
the oil and gas in and under his tract or tracts. or the equivalent 
thereof, without having to drill unnecessary wells or inc~r other 
unnecessary expense. The pooling and the drilling of the t;·10 .. ells 
allows the recovery of oil and gas that would not other-vise be re-
covered. 
IV. The Applicable Law 
Section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code provides in part: 
Ii a tract of land is of insufficient size 
or shape to meet the requirements for drilling 
a well thereon ... and the owner has been unable 
to form a drilling unit under agreement .... the 
owner of such tract may make application to the 
division of oil and gas for a mandatory pooling 
order. 
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· •..• [T]he chief, if satisfied .•. that 
mandatory pooling is necessary to protect 
correlative rights or to provide effective 
development. use, or conservation of oil and 
gas, shall issue a drilling permit and a 
mandatory pooling order ...• 
This section is one of the key provisions of Chapter 1509 of the 
Ohio Revised Code. which chapter is designed to protect both the 
public interest in the conservation and efficient development of the 
oil and gas within the state and the private property interests of 
those. like the Appellants. who own land that overlies deposits of oil 
and gas, 
The purposes and workings of Chapter 1509 can best be understood 
by comparing its provisions with the rules of law that were applicable 
to oil and gas within the State of Ohio before the legislature 
undertook to regulate the production of those minerals. The leading 
case on this subject. Kelley v, Ohio Oil Co'., 57 Ohio St. 317(1897), 
in ~ny ways resembles the instant case. The plaintiff in Kelley 
(who corresponds to the Appellants herein) sought to enjoin the 
defendant. (who corresponds to Orion) from drilling wells on lands of 
the .defendant which wells were located twenty-five feet from the 
plaintiff?s land and extracted oil which originated under the 
plaintiff's land. The Court held: 
Id. at 327-28. 
Id. ·at 329. 
To drill an oil well near the line of 
one·s land. can not .interfere with the legal 
rights of the owner of the adjoining lands. 
so long as all operations are confined to the 
lands upon which the well is drilled. What-
ever gets into the well, belongs to the 
owner of the well, no matter where it came 
from. In such cases the well and its con-
tents belong to the owner or lesse~ of the. 
land, and no one can tell to a certainty 
from whence the oil, gas or water which 
enters the well came, and no legal rights 
as to the same can be established or en-
forced by an adjoining land owner. 
Protection of lines of adjoining lands. 
by the drilling of wells on both sides of 
such lines. affords an ample and sufficient 
remedy for the supposed grievances com~ 
plained of in the petition and supplemental 
petition, without resort to either an in-junction or an accounting. 
t". 12 l' 
Thus under Ohio law, 'Vlere it not modified !Jy statute, Orion would 
be emp.owered to drill wells on the Carsten tract (and on the Kruse 
tract for that matter) immediately adjacent to the Appellants' land, 
even though such wells would capture the oil and gas under Appe~lants' 
land. The only protection that the Appellants (or Viking) would 
have would be to drill wells on their own land immediately adjacent 
to their boundary with the Carsten tract (and the Kruse tract). 
It is clear on the facts of the present case that the Appellants 
would not be content with such protection. They are not concerned 
'. 
with capturing all the oil and gas located under their land; rather 
they want to prevent any further wells from being located on their 
land or anywhere near their land. Kelley establishes, however, that 
the Appellants have no right to prevent wells from being drilled 
on the Carsten tract (or the Kruse tract) even if those wells are 
located immediately next to the Appellants' land. 
The Appellants concern about possible damage to their land is 
Understandable. but that concern is protected by the law of trespass 
and of nuisance. The granting of permission by the Division of Oil 
and'Gas ·to drill the two wells does not deprive the Appellants of 
their right to relief in the courts if the drilling or the operation 
of the wells should result in a trespass upon, or a nuisance with 
respect to, their land. The subject order expressly forbids any 
trespass upon the Appellants' land. 
[W]hile what is authorized by law cannot 
be a public nuisance, it may nevertheless 
be a private nuisance, and the legislative 
authority does not affect any claim of a 
private citizen for damages for any special 
inconvenience and discomfort caused by the 
authorized act not experienced by the public 
at large, or for an injunction. This rule 
has been followed in Ohio, and the legislat~re 
cannot authorize the creation of a continuing 
nuisance which, in effect, becomes a standing' 
menace to health and destroys private property. 
If an enterprise authorized by law is operated 
in such a manner as to constitute a private 
nuisance, the person injured may recover 
damages therefore, and equity. where the 
circwustances are such as to give it juris-
diction, will enjoin the further continuance 
of the nuisance. 
41 Q. Jur. 2d III (1960). 
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To the ex~~nt that the Appellancs are concerned about ~he 
possib.ility of damage to their land. it should be noted that section 
1509.072 of the Ohio Revised Code su?plies additional protection 
that was not available at co~on law. ~iat section provides in 
part: "No oil or gas well o .. -uer or his agent shall fail to restore 
the land surface within the area disturbed in siting. drilling. 
completing. and produc.ing the well ••. ". 
The rules established in Kelley still determine the basic rights 
of landown~rs with respect to oil and gas under their land. Each 
has the right to drill for, and to produce. such oil and gas as 
he can capture from under h:j.s land. :TIle owners of the Cars ten 
and Kruse. tracts each have this r.ight and !).othing in chapter 1509 
of the Ohio Revised Code deprives those owners of this right. 
Kelley also established that each owner has the right to protect 
his interests in preventing the oil and gas located under his land 
from being captured by neighboring landowners. The "remedy" 
suggested by Kelley, each owner being allowed to drill a series of 
wells right along the property line, is not the most satisfactory 
means of protecting the property rights of owners of adjoining 
tracts located over a single pool of oil or gas. 
In the first place. the cost of drilling "defensive" wells that 
are not necessary for the production of oil and gas is a waste of 
the ow-uers' resources. ~fuere an~il or gas field is divided among 
many owners. it may not be profitable to drill any wells because 
each owner must drill at least one well if he is to capture any 
of "his" oil and gas and none of the many wells will produce enough 
to pay the cost of drilling it, even though a lesser n~~ber of wells 
would be profitable. Furthermore. the only wayan owner can protect 
his interests under the rule in Kelley's Case is to· produce his 
wells as rapidly as possible, since any oil or gas that he does 
not capture may be captured by his neighbor. This has the unfortunate 
consequence for the owner that he cannot choose the most profitable 
rate of production. 
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There appe~rs ',. to be some truth in the '" 
dictcm that everybody's property is nobody·s 
property. Wealth that is free for all is 
valued by none because he who is foolhardy 
enough to wait for its proper time of use 
will only find that it has been taken by 
another .... [T]he oil left under the earth 
is valueless to the driller, for another 
may legally take it. '" A factor of pro-
duction that is valued at nothing in the 
business calculations of its users will 
yield nothing in income ..•• 
Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Prooertv Resource: The Fishery: 
62 J. Pol. Econ. 124, 135 (1954); See also Friedman, rne Economics of 
the Common 'Pool: Property: Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 U.C.L.A. 
L.Rev. 855 (1971). 
The most important cost that results from the ftremedy" approved 
by Kellev is that the necessity of rapid production could reduce the 
total amount of oil and gas that can be produced from a field. It 
takes energy to ~roduce oil and gas and the natural sources of energy 
in an oil field can be inefficiently dissipated and wasted if the oil 
and gas are produced too rapidly. If a field is produced too 
rapidly, oil and gas which could have been recovered if the rate 
of producticin had been slower may be lost forever. 
In such circumstances, legislation supplying a better remedy 
than the right to drill "defensive" wells is in the interest of 
every owner of land in an oil or gas field. 
Moreover, 
Not only are the correlative rights of the 
individual owners of the common propercy 
involved, but the public at large has a 
vital interest in the fullest development 
and maximum recovery at the minimum cost 
to the public of this valuable and most 
important natural resource. These facts 
have long been recognized by the courts 
and are documented in many decisions. 
Williams, Compulsory: Pooling and Unitization (of Oil and Gas Rights). 
15th Anuual Institute on Oil and Cas Law and Taxation, 223, 226-27 
(1964). 
When property, in which several persons 
have a common interest, cannot be fully and 
beneficially enjoyed in its existing con-
dition, the law often provides a way in which 
they may compel one another to submit to 
measures necessary to secure its beneficial 
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enjovment, making eau:':;able cOl:lPensat1.on to 
any ~hose control of or"interest in the 
property is thereby ~odified. 
Head v, A;noskeag ?-lfg. Co., 113 U. S, 9. 21(1885)" 
Considerin~ these facts, it is not surprising that reany states 
have passed legislation designed to prevent inefficiency and waste 
in the production of oil and gas and to preserve the correlative 
rights of owners to produce the oil and gas that is located under 
their land, 
As the\Supreme Court explained in Ohio Oil Co, v. Indiana, 177 
U.S. 190 (1900), a case sustaining a state's power to regulate oil 
and gas: 
[AJs to gas and oil the surface proprietors 
within the gas field all have the right to 
reduce to possession the oil and gas beneath. 
They could not be absolutely deprived of this 
right which belongs to them without a taking 
of private property. But there is a coequal 
right in them all to take from a" common 
source of supply the two substances .... It 
follows from the essence of their right and 
from the situation of the things as to which 
it can be exerted, that the use by one of 
his power to seek to convert a part of the 
common fund to actual possession may result 
in an undue proportion being attributed to 
" one of the possessors of the right to the 
detriment of the others, or by waste by one 
or more to the annihilation of the rights 
of the remainder. Hence it is that the 
legislative power, from the peculiar nature 
of the right and the objects upon which it 
is to be exerted, can be manifested for the 
purpose of protecting all the collective 
owners, by securing a just distribution, "to 
arise from the enjoyment, by them. of their 
privilege to reduce to possession, and to 
reach the like end by preventing waste ..•. 
Viewed, then, as a statute to protect or to 
prevent the waste of the common property of 
the surfaCY owners, the law .. ,'",hich is here 
attacked .•. is a statute protecting private 
property and preventing it from being taken 
by one of the common otmers without regard 
to the enjoyment of the others. 
Id. at 209-210. 
Ohio Revised Code Chapter 1509 was adopted in 1965. The purpose 
of this statute is to prevent physical and economic waste and to 
protect the correlative rights of mineral owners. See Emens and 
Lowe, Ohio Oil and Gas Conservation Law--The First Ten Years (1965-
1975), 37 Ohio St. L.J. 31 (1976); Heyers and Williams. Petroleum 
Conservation in Ohio, 26 Ohio St. L.J. 591 (1965). 
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"loiaste". is defined asc 
"Haste" includes: 
(1) Physical waste, as such term is 
generally understood in the oil and gas 
industry; 
(2) Inefficient, excessive, or im-
proper use, or the unnecessary dissi?ation 
of, reservoir energy; 
(3) Inefficient storing of oil or gasi 
(4) Locating, drilling, equipping, 
operating. or producing an oil or gas well 
in a manner that reduces or tends to reduce 
the quantity of oil or gas ultimately 
recoverable under prudent and proper 
operations from the pool into which it is 
drilled. or that causes or tends to cause 
unnecessary or excessive surface loss or 
destruction of oil or gas; 
(5) Other underground or surface \-1aste 
in the production or· storage of oil, gas, 
or condensate, however caused. 
Ohio Revised Code §l509.l (H) 
lTjhe pr1mary thrust of the new statutory 
provisions was toward the prevention of 
physical and economic waste .. The act 
authorized the Chief, with the consent 
of the Technical Advisory Council. to set 
minimum spacing requirements for drilling 
in order to control the number of wells 
which might be drilled on adjoining tracts 
to drain the oil and gas from under a 
given area, Mandatory pooling was authorized 
to prevent waste as well as to protect 
correlative rights. Unitization was 
authorized if the Chief found "that such 
operation is reasonably necessary to 
increase substantially the ultimate ~ecovery 
of oil and gas ... " subject to approval of 
a required percentage of mineral and royalcy 
owners. The act specifically required the 
use of "every reasonable precaution in 
accordance with the most approved methods 
of operation to stop and prevent waste of 
oil or gas, or both." 
Emens and Lowe, supra, at 37. [Footnotes omitted} 
The law also provided a number of devices 
to protect the correlative rights of minerel 
owners. Voluntary pooling was specifically 
permitted. The statute also provided that the 
Chief might, upon application by the ow~er, 
order the mandatory pooling of adjoining tracts 
in order to protect the interests of one or more 
of the owners, if voluntary arrangerr.ents could 
not be negotiated. Special provision was made 
to permit owners who were unable to join existing 
adjacent drilling units and whose tracts were 
too small to meet the standards set for t:linimuI1l 
spacing requirements to drill on those tracts, 
with limitation of production based on acreage 
and well potential, 
Id., at 36. [Footnotes ommited1 
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'~orrelacive rights U are defined as: 
(I) "Correlative rights" means the 
reasonable opportunity to every person entitled 
thereto to recover and recei'Je the oil and gas 
in and under his tract or tracts. or the equiva-
lent thereof. without having to drill unnecessary 
wells or incur other unnecess'ary expense. 
Ohio Revised Code section 1509.01(1), 
Thus the purpose of chapter 1509 is to su?ply more satisfactory, 
remedies for landowners. whose oil and gas may 'be captured by others, 
than the wasteful and inefficient right to drill defensive wells, 
It protects both the interests of mineral owners and of the general 
public by preventing waste. But the chapter also has the purpose 
of protecting the basic right of each landowner, as established in 
Kellay, to be able to obtain the benefit of the petroleum under his 
land. 
In view of this Board·s findings herein, it is apparent that 
the Adjudication Order that is the subject of this appeal is authorized 
by section 1509.27 of the Ohio Revised Code, since it is necessary 
both to protect the correlative rights of those having a beneficial 
interest in the Carsten and Kruse tracts and to provide effective 
development and conservation of the oil and gas located under the 
drilling tract provided by that order. The order prevents waste 
and protects correlative rights. If the order had nGt been issued, 
the owners of the Carste~ and Kruse tracts would have been deprived 
of the property rights that they have under the decision in Kelley 
and that are protected by Chapter 1509. 
On the other hand, since the Appellants have no right to prevent 
the owners of the Carsten tract from drilling wells upon that tract, 
the Appellants have not in any way been damaged by the issuance of 
the subject order. In fact the Appellants will be benefitted by 
the receipt of addition.al royalties which they would not' have 
received if the application for the' order had been denied. The 
Appellants' objection to the "mandatory" or "compulsory" pooling 
is not well taken. 
- 18 -
Neither "pooling'! nor "unitization, II as 
herein used, contemplates or requires a cross-
assignment of title to land or to oil and gas 
rights. Prevalent pooling and unitization 
statutes merely contemplate the joint develop-
ment and operation of the lands as if included 
in a single lease, a sharing of costs, and a 
fair division of the production thus jointly 
obtained. 
The term "compulsory" is unfortunate but 
is used because of common usage. It does not 
mean arbitrary governmental action compelling 
persons generally to act against their will any 
more than does any other law passed to accom-
modate and adjust for the common and public 
good, the co-related or correlative rights 
and interests of all persons in a community, 
or particularly those having interests in a 
common property or common fund in instances 
where they cannot agree. This is the purpose 
and function of all laws. All are "compulsory" 
in this sense, "Statutory pooling and unitization" 
would be a better phrase. 
Williams, supra, at 224-25. 
The fact that the mineral lease to the Appellants' land does not 
contain a clause permitting pooling is not a valid objection to the 
~ubject order, which could have been issued even if the Appellants 
hadnever leased their land. Although the Appellants do not want the 
two new wells to be drilled on neighboring land, they have no right 
to prevent it. That is the teaching of Kelley. The only change 
that has occurred with the adoption of Chapter 1509 is that the 
Appellants will receive the benefit of royalties from the production 
of wells that are not located on their land. 
V. Conclusion 
Based upon the findings of fact herein and the applicable law, 
the Board finds that Adjudication Order No. 229 was lawful and 
reasonable; and 
ORDERS that Adjudication Order No. 229 be, and it hereby is, AFFIRMED. 
This order effective this /0 vi 
day of ~' 1978. 
OJJ:.~rD GAS BOARD OF REVIEW 
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